Frederick Kaufman, Pre-vital and Post-mortem Non-existence.  American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.36, No.1, January 1999.

Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus (one paragraph)

Most everyone thinks that something is wrong with Epicurus’ (c.300 BCE) argument against the
fear of death; very few recent philosophers have agreed with or defended Epicurus!  Lucretius (c.75 BCE) agrees with Epicurus and presents Epicurus’ argument with considerable verve and passion.  Furthermore, in a very brief passage recently highlighted by several “analytic” philosophers Lucretius seems to introduce a consideration (the “symmetry argument”) that much strengthens Epicurus’ basic argument.  (Lucretius himself seems merely to have mentioned it in passing, not making a big deal of it.)  All Lucretius says about it is in footnote 14, p.17 of the handout.  So in the past 20 or so years there has been a series of articles and books by analytic philosophers focusing on Epicurus and Lucretius on the fear of death.

Kaufman does a pretty good job of summarizing the recent history of attempts to show what is
wrong with the Epicurus-Lucretius arguments; and then he offers his own approach which,
naturally, he thinks is a significant improvement.

Notes.  “The deprivation account” (or, argument) is aimed at showing what is wrong with
Epicurus’ argument.  “The symmetry argument” is aimed at showing that Epicurus argument,
supplemented by Lucretius’ suggestion about symmetry, is better than deprivation-arguers
thought.  Nagel and Parfit have different arguments against the symmetry argument, aimed at
showing that Epicurus/Lucretius are wrong even when supplemented by the symmetry argument.
Kaufman, in section VI, claims to strengthen Nagel’s argument to the point that he has definitely
refuted the Lucretus-inspired symmetry argument.

Key concepts to note and think about: modal considerations (p.3 col 4); extrinsic badness (p.4);
metaphysical essences (p.11); “thick” and “thin” persons (p.12-15).

DWA Questions.

1)  State in one sentence (your words, not a quote) the “deprivation” answer to Epicurus.

2) What (in section II) does Kaufman mean by “a problem” with the deprivation account?  In
other words, what is that problem?  How serious does Kaufman think the problem is?

3) State in one sentence the symmetry account, including how it apparently supports the
conclusion that death should not be feared.

4) What problem does the symmetry account create for the deprivation account?

5) State, as briefly yet accurately as you can, Kaufman’s answer to Lucretius.

6) Does Kaufman think that you (or, anyone else) could have been born at any other time or place
than when and where you actually were born?  Explain why, or why not.